9. Security Model

9.1 Security Philosophy

ISONET is built with a “zero trust, zero knowledge, zero leaks” model. All components—routing, identity, payments, node rewards—operate under the assumption that any node, user, or service might be malicious. The protocol therefore relies on cryptography, not trust.


9.2 Threat Model

ISONET is designed to defend against:

🔹 External Threats

  • ISPs monitoring or throttling

  • Government surveillance

  • Network traffic correlation attacks

  • Man‑in‑the‑middle (MITM)

  • DDoS attempts on routing endpoints

🔹 Internal Threats

  • Malicious node operators

  • Node collusion attempts

  • Key leakage

  • Reward manipulation

  • Rogue governance proposals


9.3 Cryptographic Foundations

✔ End-to-End Encryption

Every packet is encrypted using:

  • AES‑256‑GCM (symmetric encryption)

  • X25519 (key exchange)

  • HMAC‑SHA3 message authentication

Nodes cannot decrypt packet contents.

✔ Multi‑Layer Onion Encryption

Each hop unwraps only one layer of the packet. Node A cannot know:

  • Original source

  • Final destination

  • Packet payload

✔ Zero-Knowledge Authentication

Used to:

  • Verify subscription without revealing identity

  • Validate node stake without showing wallet balance

  • Generate temporary anonymous session keys

✔ Distributed Key Rotation

Keys automatically rotate every 15 minutes.


9.4 Node Security

🔐 Slashing Policies

Nodes lose stake if:

  • Uptime < 95%

  • Malicious traffic manipulation detected

  • They attempt packet inspection

  • They fail ZK compliance audits

Architect Tier nodes have stricter rules.

🛡 Node Isolation Sandbox

Node software runs inside:

  • Seccomp isolation

  • eBPF traffic filters

  • Mandatory encrypted storage


9.5 Governance Security

Multisig Treasury

All protocol treasury actions require:

  • 5 of 9 signatures

  • Hardware wallet approval

  • 72-hour timelock

Proposal Safety Checks

Before voting begins, proposals are automatically scanned for:

  • Unbounded withdrawals

  • Infinite minting attempts

  • Privilege escalation

  • Parameter manipulation

Anything unsafe is blocked.


9.6 DDoS & Sybil Resistance

Sybil Costs

To operate nodes, actors must:

  • Stake $ISONET

  • Provide validated bandwidth

  • Maintain uptime metrics

Collusion becomes economically expensive.

DDoS Mitigation

  • Hidden entry nodes

  • Rotating routing endpoints

  • Encrypted handshake requirements

  • Protocol-level throttling


9.7 Security Roadmap (2025–2027)

1

Phase 1

ZK upgrade (planned for Q3)

2

Phase 2

MPC-secured governance

3

Phase 3

Decentralized identity federation

4

Phase 4

Post‑quantum encryption upgrade (Kyber + Dilithium)

5

Phase 5

Fully trustless node audits using ZK‑SNARKs


Summary: ISONET’s security model is designed for adversarial environments and assumes no entity can be trusted. Through cryptography, slashing, governance controls, and sandboxed routing, the network remains resilient—even at massive scale.