9.1 Security Philosophy
ISONET is built with a “zero trust, zero knowledge, zero leaks” model.
All components—routing, identity, payments, node rewards—operate under the assumption that any node, user, or service might be malicious.
The protocol therefore relies on cryptography, not trust.
9.2 Threat Model
ISONET is designed to defend against:
🔹 External Threats
ISPs monitoring or throttling
Network traffic correlation attacks
DDoS attempts on routing endpoints
🔹 Internal Threats
Rogue governance proposals
9.3 Cryptographic Foundations
✔ End-to-End Encryption
Every packet is encrypted using:
AES‑256‑GCM (symmetric encryption)
HMAC‑SHA3 message authentication
Nodes cannot decrypt packet contents.
✔ Multi‑Layer Onion Encryption
Each hop unwraps only one layer of the packet.
Node A cannot know:
✔ Zero-Knowledge Authentication
Used to:
Verify subscription without revealing identity
Validate node stake without showing wallet balance
Generate temporary anonymous session keys
✔ Distributed Key Rotation
Keys automatically rotate every 15 minutes.
9.4 Node Security
🔐 Slashing Policies
Nodes lose stake if:
Malicious traffic manipulation detected
They attempt packet inspection
They fail ZK compliance audits
Architect Tier nodes have stricter rules.
🛡 Node Isolation Sandbox
Node software runs inside:
Mandatory encrypted storage
9.5 Governance Security
Multisig Treasury
All protocol treasury actions require:
Proposal Safety Checks
Before voting begins, proposals are automatically scanned for:
Infinite minting attempts
Anything unsafe is blocked.
9.6 DDoS & Sybil Resistance
To operate nodes, actors must:
Provide validated bandwidth
Collusion becomes economically expensive.
DDoS Mitigation
Rotating routing endpoints
Encrypted handshake requirements
Protocol-level throttling
9.7 Security Roadmap (2025–2027)
ZK upgrade (planned for Q3)
Decentralized identity federation
Post‑quantum encryption upgrade (Kyber + Dilithium)
Fully trustless node audits using ZK‑SNARKs